RelayKing automatically identifies tier-0 assets — ADCS (Active Directory Certificate Services), SCCM, and Exchange servers — during scanning. Any relayable HTTP or HTTPS service on a detected tier-0 asset is escalated to CRITICAL severity because of the outsized domain impact these targets offer.Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://mintlify.com/depthsecurity/RelayKing-Depth/llms.txt
Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
Why tier-0 targets matter
| Asset | Relay impact |
|---|---|
| ADCS | ESC8 — relay an authentication to /certsrv/ to enroll a certificate for any domain account, then use PKINIT to obtain a TGT and potentially full domain compromise |
| SCCM | Relay to the SCCM management point to deploy scripts, create admin accounts, or access managed device secrets |
| Exchange | Relay to OWA or EWS to access mail, exfiltrate data, or abuse Exchange permissions (e.g., DCSync via msExchPrivilegeCriticalObject) |
Detection methods
Tier-0 assets are identified using two complementary methods: LDAP enumeration and HTTP probing. LDAP detection is more reliable; HTTP detection is a fallback that works even without credentials.LDAP enumeration (audit mode)
When--audit is used, RelayKing queries the domain controller via LDAP to enumerate tier-0 assets:
| Asset | LDAP filter | Search base |
|---|---|---|
| ADCS | (&(objectClass=pKIEnrollmentService)) | CN=Enrollment Services,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=... |
| SCCM | (objectclass=mssmssite) | Domain root; extracts mSSMSMPName, mSSMSSiteSystemList, mSSMSDefaultMP attributes |
| Exchange | (cn=Exchange Trusted Subsystem) | Domain root; resolves member computer objects via distinguishedName lookup |
HTTP probing (all modes)
During HTTP/HTTPS scanning, RelayKing probes every host for the ADCS enrollment endpoint:401 Unauthorized response with NTLM or Negotiate in the WWW-Authenticate header confirms an ADCS server. This check runs on both port 80 (HTTP) and port 443 (HTTPS).
Hostname heuristics (fallback)
When LDAP detection is not available (e.g., no--audit mode, or LDAP enumeration failed), RelayKing falls back to hostname substring matching:
| Heuristic | Matches |
|---|---|
sccm | Any hostname containing sccm |
mecm | Any hostname containing mecm |
configmgr | Any hostname containing configmgr |
certsrv | Any hostname containing certsrv |
pki | Any hostname containing pki |
ca is intentionally excluded from hostname heuristics. It matches too many unrelated hostnames (e.g., Exchange CAS servers, certificate authority names in distinguished names). ADCS detection relies on LDAP pKIEnrollmentService queries or the /certsrv/ HTTP probe.Impact on relay path severity
Fromrelay_analyzer.py, the impact calculation for HTTP/HTTPS paths:
Exploiting ADCS relay paths (ESC8)
When RelayKing reports a CRITICAL HTTP/HTTPS relay path against an ADCS server:Verify the ADCS finding
Check the relay path description in the report. An ESC8-exploitable path looks like:
Enabling tier-0 detection
Tier-0 LDAP detection runs automatically in--audit mode. HTTP-based ADCS detection runs when http or https is included in --protocols:
